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One of the primary tools available to a Joint Commander-in-Chief (CINC) for
training his staff on their joint mission essential tasks is a command post exercise (CPX)
supported by a computer simulation model. This is commonly referred to as a Computer
Aided Exercise (CAX). Computer Aided Exercises are an essential part of training a
component staff; however, one weakness with these valuable tools lies in the measurement
of the level of training received by the players. In most CPXs the players rapidly disperse
after the exercise and little quantitative data are captured during the running of the CAX
that allows for a quick post exercise analysis. This research presents a methodology for
evaluating the performance ofjoint operational firepower tasks as set forth in the Universal
Joint Task List. While demonstrating this methodology for developing quantifiable
measures of effectiveness in operational firepower, this thesis also shows how the
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One of the primary tools available to a Joint Commander-in-Chief (CINC) for
training his staff on their joint mission essential tasks is a command post exercise (CPX)
supported by a computer simulation model. Computer Aided Exercises (CAXs) are an
essential part of training a component staff; however, one weakness with these valuable
tools lies in the measurement of the level of training received by the players. In most
CPXs the players rapidly disperse after the exercise and little quantitative data are captured
during the running of the CAX that allows for a quick post exercise analysis. Assessment
of process performance in relationship to ability to perform mission essential tasks is
important for two reasons. First, it helps to determine whether training resources are being
used wisely and if the training program is achieving desired results. Second, it helps to
determine which mission essential tasks are in need of additional training.
The objective of this thesis is to develop an exercise analysis methodology for
evaluating the execution of joint tasks during a CAX. Specific objectives are: 1)
Demonstrate a methodology for developing quantifiable measures of effectiveness
(MOEs) designed to work in conjunction with the data retrieved from a computer
simulation. These measures must reflect the hierarchical structure of tasks as applied to the
three levels of war (vertical linkage), and functionality considerations between related
enabling tasks (horizontal linkage). 2) Determine methods for implementing staff plans
and capturing task performance data within the design of the simulation. This is intended
to support the exercise analysis by capturing critical decisions, assumptions and causal
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factors inherent within staff actions as they relate to plan execution and provides a
framework within which conclusions about observed outcomes can be based. This
objective involves demonstrating the methodology in an exercise conducted utilizing the
Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). Implicit tasks include aligning plan requirements
with the model's database, developing algorithms required in post processing, and
specifying output file format.
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) is a comprehensive listing of all joint tasks
pertaining to the Armed Forces of the United States of America. It provides a common
language for describing joint warfare capabilities throughout the entire range of military
operations to include military operations other than war (MOOTW). Specifically, tasks are
defined as they relate to the strategic (national and theater), operational, and tactical levels
of war. Each joint task is broken down into supporting tasks which may further be broken
down into enabling tasks.
Essential to this methodology is the understanding that a common functionality
exists at the different levels of war. For example, at the strategic theater level, the UJTL
task "Employ Theater Strategic Firepower" (ST 3) is related to "Employ Operational
Firepower" (OP 3) at the operational level. Furthermore, employ operational firepower is
related to the tactical level task "Employ Firepower" (TA 3). A horizontal link also exists
within the UJTL. This link pertains to the dependence of one task on another at the same
level of war. For instance, operational firepower cannot be effectively employed if
operational intelligence (OP 2) is ignored. Additionally, operational maneuver (OP 1) is
seldom successful without effective operational firepower. Hence, to provide operational
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firepower successfully, joint staffs must be proficient in their ability to work both vertically
and horizontally throughout the UJTL. In analysis, it is necessary to reflect the dynamics
of vertical and horizontal linkages as a matter of aggregation and in the interest of
maintaining the appropriate level of abstraction.
This research presents a methodology for evaluating the performance of joint
operational firepower tasks as set forth in the Universal Joint Task List. While
demonstrating this methodology for developing quantifiable measures of effectiveness in
operational firepower, this thesis also shows how the relationship of operational firepower
and operational intelligence can be refined for enhanced firepower effectiveness.
Implementation of the methodology places no burden on the staff during the course of the






The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memorandum of Policy 26 (MOP 26)
establishes a program for carrying out the joint training responsibilities for the CJCS, the
Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs), and the CINCs' component staffs. MOP 26
institutes a method for identifying training requirements through the review of the
CINCs mission and the compilation of Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). A
CINCs JMETL is intended to provide the basis for all joint training.
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) [Ref 1], a supplement to the Joint Training
Manual (MCM-71-92), is a comprehensive listing of all joint tasks pertaining to the
Armed Forces of the United States of America. It provides a common language for
describing joint warfare capabilities throughout the entire range of military operations to
include military operations other than war (MOOTW). Specifically, tasks are defined as
they relate to the strategic (national and theater), operational, and tactical levels of war.
Each joint task is broken down into supporting tasks which may further be broken down
into enabling tasks.
One primary training tool available to a CEMC for training his staff on their joint
mission essential tasks is a command post exercise (CPX) supported by some type of
computer simulation model. This is commonly referred to as a Computer Aided Exercise
(CAX). The primary role of the computer simulation is to present a decision
environment within which the staff can be presented with realistic, stochastic results.
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Based on this simulated environment, a staff can implement plans, monitor the current
situations, and further develop or alter its plan as dictated by the changing requirements.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The objective of this thesis is to develop an exercise analysis methodology for
evaluating the execution of joint tasks during a CAX. Specific objectives are: 1)
Demonstrate a methodology for developing quantifiable measures of effectiveness
(MOEs) designed to work in conjunction with the data retrieved from a computer
simulation. These measures must reflect the hierarchical structure of tasks as applied to
the three levels of war (vertical linkage), and functionality considerations between related
enabling tasks (horizontal linkage). 2) Determine methods for implementing staff plans
and capturing task performance data within the design of the simulation. This is intended
to support the exercise analysis by capturing critical decisions, assumptions and causal
factors inherent within staff actions as they relate to plan execution; and will provide a
framework within which conclusions about observed outcomes can be based. This
objective involves demonstrating the methodology in an exercise conducted utilizing the
Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). Implicit tasks include aligning plan requirements
with the model's database, developing algorithms required in post processing and
specifying output file format.
The area that this report will address is the processing of High Payoff Targets
(HPTs). HPTs are those targets that must be acquired and attacked to ensure the success
of friendly operations [Ref. 2].
It is important to emphasize that this research is part of a larger ongoing research
project which provides an overall analysis methodology for many of the joint tasks
specified in the UJTL within the context of a CAX. Concurrent with the development of
the methodology presented in this paper are related efforts by MAJ Mark Cwick (TJSMC)
[Ref. 3], CPT Kevin Brown (USA) [Ref. 4], CPT John Thurman (USA) [Ref. 5], LT
John Mustin (USN) [Ref. 6], and LT Mark Sullivan (USN) [Ref. 7]; all of which involve
the UJTL and JTLS. This research also parallels previous research by LT Chris Towery
(USN) on intelligence tasks [Ref. 8]; and CPT Ray Combs (USA) on logistics tasks
[Ref. 9]. Since the performance of one joint task during a CAX often impacts the
performance of another joint task, it is strongly recommended that the reader consider all
papers in order to gain insight into the overall analysis methodology which attempts to
identify common causal factors that influence significant events that occur during a
CAX
C. THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter II provides a brief overview of the UJTL and Operational Firepower
definitions. Chapter III describes the proposed analysis methodology used to assess staff
performance. The methodology focuses on the analysis of significant events. Chapter
IV applies the methodology to a typical exercise scenario using the Joint Theater Level
Simulation. Additionally, Chapter IV discusses the data manipulation that is necessary
for the post exercise analysis using an existing computer simulation Chapter V
summarizes the methodology and provides recommendations for further refinements and
study.
H. JOINT TRAINING PROCESS
Military victories are not gained by a single arm, though failure of any
arm or service might well be disastrous, but are achieved through the
effort of all arms and Services welded into ...a team. General of the
Army George C. Marshall
As the world leader, the United States of America requires the strongest and most
capable military. In today's economy, the United States military has no other choice but
to learn how to train and fight in the joint arena. With only limited assets, leaders at all
levels must learn to train with sister services in order to gain trust, learn limitations and
capabilities, maintain proficiency, and, most important, ensure success in the next battle.
A. THE UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL)
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) [Ref. 1] was developed by the Dynamics
Research Corporation (DRC) under the guidance of the Joint Exercise and Training
Division (JETD) of the J-7 Directorate, Joint Staff. Over 120 organizations have
provided input, all of which have been coordinated through the Joint Staff, CENCs,
Services, and other concerned governmental agencies. The UJTL provides a
standardized tool for describing requirements in the planning, conducting, assessing and
evaluating joint and multinational training. Capabilities described within the UJTL cover
the entire range of military operations, to include military operations other than war.
The UJTL is broken down into three levels: Strategic (National Military Strategy
and Strategic Theater), Operational, and Tactical (Figure 1 ). The UJTL involves the
joint task list, joint conditions list, and associated task measures. The joint task list

consists of all joint, supporting and enabling tasks at each of the three levels of war.
These levels formally specify the required capabilities of the nation's armed forces. The
joint conditions list contains various physical, political, social, and military states that
describe operational environments. Task measure of effectiveness are parameters
describing task performance that, when specified in terms of conditions and a minimum
acceptable level of performance, are a statement of task standards. The joint measures
list provides performance criteria at the task level to assist commanders in assessing their
staff performance and determining those tasks that may require further training. Figure 1
shows the organization and large scale breakdown of the UJTL.
strategic NATIONAL
SN.1 SN.2 SN.3 SUA SN.6
CONDUCT STRATEGIC DEVELOP CONDUCT PROVIDE PROVIDE
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Figure 1. Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) depicting the organization
broken down into three levels.

B. JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (JMETL)
A Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) includes those tasks that a regional
CINC deems necessary to focus his training efforts in order to accomplish a specific
mission. All Joint Mission Essential Tasks must be referenced to the UJTL. A CINC's
JMETL is intended to provide the basis for all joint training.
C. JOINT TRAINING PROGRAM
The joint training program encompasses all aspects of the joint training process
within the Department of Defense. Its purpose is to better link the joint training system
and the joint doctrine system to provide an improved fighting force for the CINCs.
Training must be based on mission requirements, with the highest priority being
warfighting; and joint training must be guided by joint doctrine. Missions that support
national military strategy are assigned to the CINCs. Upon receipt, an analysis is
conducted to determine what capabilities are required for the successful completion of
the mission. Essential capabilities and requirements for training are reflected in the
CINC's JMETL along with joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques and procedures
(JTTP). They are then analyzed in term of appropriate mission conditions, necessary
standards, command level responsibility and training resources available in order to
generate the CINC's Joint Training Plan and subsequent training schedules. The focus is
clearly on defining joint training requirements in order to use scarce resources as
efficiently as possible. The Universal Joint Task List plays an essential role in the
overall process of evaluating the joint training and readiness process The focus and
product of this thesis will assist in providing direct integration of the CINC's JMETL
into the training exercise, allowing for a rapid and accurate analysis of operational
firepower.
D. OPERATIONAL FIREPOWER
You should not have a favorite weapon. To become overly familiar with
one weapon is as much a fault as not knowing it sufficiently well....It is
badfor commanders... to have likes and dislikes. (Miyamoto Musashi,
1 7th century Japanese warrior, The Book ofFive Rings)
Joint firepower can be classified as tactical, operational or strategic, based on its
intended effect. Operational firepower refers to the application of non-lethal and lethal
firepower to achieve a decisive impact on a the conduct of a campaign or major
operation. Operational firepower can be joint and multinational. All services contribute
capabilities that can be used for operational firepower. To synchronize operations, one
component may provide fires to support another component's operation. [Ref. 10]
Operational firepower must also be closely integrated and synchronized with the concept
of operations for maneuver. In that regard, operational firepower is integrated normally
with operational land maneuver for synergistic effects, staying power and more rapid
achievement of strategic aims.
Operational firepower includes targeting and attacking land and sea targets whose
destruction or neutralization will have a major impact on a subordinate campaign or
major operation. It must be noted that intelligence, at all levels, plays an important role
in targeting and the targeting process. In that regard, one cannot look at the definition of
operational firepower without considering how it relates to operational intelligence.
Operational firepower includes the allocation ofjoint and multinational air, land, and sea
(surface and subsurface) and space means. It can be designed to achieve a single,
operationally significant objective that could have a major impact on the campaign and
major operation. With accurate intelligence, operational firepower focuses largely on
one or more of the following:
* Destruction of critical functions, facilities and forces having operational
significance.
* Isolation of a specific battle within the battle space.
* Facilitation of maneuver to operational depths.
Systems capable of providing operational firepower generally include (but are not limited
to) land and sea based airpower assets and surface-to-surface firepower. [Ref 10]
E. TARGETS, TARGET ANALYSIS AND TARGETING
A target is an enemy function, formation, equipment, facility or terrain planned
for capture, destruction, neutralization or degradation in order to disrupt, delay or limit
the enemy.
Target analysis is the examination of potential targets to determine military
importance, priority of attack and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage.
[Ref. 11] Target analysis is done at all levels by the intelligence staffs and sections.
During target analysis High Value Targets (HVTs) and High Payoff Targets (HPTs) are
determined. A High Value Target (HVT) is an asset that the enemy commander requires
for the successful completion of his mission. [Ref 2] A High Payoff Target (HPT) is
one that must be acquired and attacked to ensure the success of friendly operations.
[Ref. 2] In a many cases an enemy element that has been designated as a critical node
will be targeted and designated as a HPT. A critical node is an element, position, or
communication entity whose disruption or distinction immediately degrades the ability of
a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat operations. [Ref 11]
Targeting is the process of identifying enemy targets and matching them with the
appropriate weapon system, taking into account operational requirements and capability.
[Ref. 12] Again, intelligence staffs and sections play a key role in targeting. The
emphasis of targeting is on identifying resources that the enemy can least afford to lose.
Denying these resources to the enemy strips him of the initiative; it forces him to
conform to friendly battle plans. [Ref. 2]
The targeting methodology is often characterized as decide-detect-deliver. The
decide function results in the approval of the HPT list. It also gives a clear picture of the
priorities that apply to tasking of target acquisition (TA) assets, information processing
and selection of attack means. The detect function is where the TA assets gather
information and report their findings to their controlling headquarters, which in turn
passes this information to the tasking agency. With regards to the UJTL, the decide and
detect phases fall under the intelligence arenas. The relationship between those tasks in
OP 2 (Develop Operational Intelligence) and TA 2 (Develop Intelligence) and OP 3
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(Employ Operational Firepower) is critical to this thesis. The main objective of the
deliver function is the attacking of targets. The delivery of munitions can be from
indirect fire assets, airpower, naval gun fire and long range missiles. The deliver phase is
operational in nature and falls under Employ Operational Firepower (OP 3) in the UJTL.
Conducting post-attack battle damage assessment is a task that also falls under
TA 2. [Ref 1] This assessment is the yard stick used to determine if previous
engagements of a target were sufficient to obtain the desired results. If the desired results
are not obtained, the target is re-engaged. This real time or actual intelligence
information is critical for effective fires. Without this information, only an assumption
can be made about the battle damage and re-engagement. This assumption is referred to
as perceived battle damage assessment.
While demonstrating a methodology for developing quantifiable measures of
effectiveness (MOEs) in operational firepower, this thesis also shows how operational
firepower and operational intelligence are linked together. Specific focus is on the time
delay between target detection and munitions delivery and the data collection regarding
perceived battle damage assessment, as well as how these data can be used to determine




This chapter introduces a methodology for developing quantifiable measures of
effectiveness for evaluating a CINC staff performance in the execution of joint
operational firepower and related fire support functions during the conduct of a
Computer Aided Exercise (CAX). These performance functions are described in terms
of the appropriate Universal Joint Tasks. The answer to the following question is the
goal of this methodology: Was accurate firepower provided in a timely manner so it
created the desired outcomefor the operationalforces?
This methodology includes structuring related joint tasks and developing issues to
performance data requirements (dendritic). Specific steps of this methodology include
developing the means to ascertain the effects of firepower during the conduct of a CAX.
Essential to this methodology is the understanding that a common functionality
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Figure 2. Common Functionality Links.
level, the task "Employ Theater Strategic Firepower" (ST 3) is related to "Employ
Operational Firepower" (OP 3) at the operational level. Furthermore, "Employ
Operational Firepower" is related to the tactical level task "Employ Firepower" (TA 3).
The next section will discuss how these vertical links also show the relationship between
the joint, supporting and enabling tasks within the different levels of war. A horizontal
link also exists within the UJTL. This link pertains to the dependence of one task on
another at the same level of war. For instance, operational firepower cannot be
effectively employed if Operational Intelligence (OP 2) is ignored. Additionally,
Operational Maneuver (OP 1) is seldom successful without effective operational
firepower. Hence, to provide operational firepower successfully, joint staffs must be
proficient in their ability to work both vertically and horizontally throughout the UJTL.
In analysis, once the vertical and horizontal links are established, then a causal audit trail
can be established leading to reasons for success or failure in the staffs approach to
operational firepower.
A. TASK DESCRIPTION AND JOINT SCHEMATIC
As previously discussed, the UJTL is broken down into tasks at the three levels of
war: strategic, operational, and tactical. It is essential to show the vertical and horizontal
links between these levels and tasks as they apply to operational firepower. However, it
is first necessary to describe how tasks at each level are broken down into joint,
supporting and enabling. Each joint task has a corresponding one digit number, while its
14
associated supporting and enabling tasks have the same leading number with additional
two and three numbers, respectively. Also, some enabling tasks have associated refined
enabling task which adds a fourth digit to the task number. Figure 3 shows an example
of a task nomenclature breakdown.
Task" Description Task Number
Jo in t Employ Operational Firepower OP 3
Supporting Conduct Joint Force Targeting OP 3.1
Enabling Establish Joint Force Targeting Strategy OP 3.1.1
Select Operational Targets for Attack OP 3.1.3
Prioritize High Payoff Targets OP 3.1.4
Joint Develop Operational Intelligence OP 2
Supporting Process Operational Information OP 2.3
Enabling Integrate Operational Intelligence OP 2.3.3
Refined Enabling Develop Operational Target Information OP 2.3.3.2
Identify Enemy Vulnerabilities OP 2.3.3.4
Figure 3. Example of a UJTL task nomenclature breakdown.
The joint schematic, shown in Figure 4, depicts the relationship among tasks at
the three levels of war as they apply to Operational Firepower. Hierarchical relationships
regarding respective levels of war are illustrated by the relative vertical positions at each
task level. Relationships between joint, supporting, enabling and refined enabling tasks
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Figure 4. Joint Task Schematic showing Joint Firepower and supporting tasks.
B. CRITICAL EVENTS
To evaluate the CINC staff performance in the execution of operational firepower
during the conduct of a CAX, is necessary to create an audit trial to ascertain the causal
reasons for any critical events that occur during the CAX. For this paper, a critical event
16

is defined as any event occurring during an exercise that is useful in the post exercise
reconstruction for analysis of the effects of operational firepower. Normally, a critical
event is viewed as a derogatory event with a less than favorable outcome. For example,
a critical event may be the fact that a SCUD missile, designated as a high payoff target,
was not shot down and damaged a logistics facility. The causal reasons for this event
would be shown through the building of an audit trail. The following example questions
could then be answered:
Was the HPT (SCUD) ever detected?
Was any firepower available?
Was the length of time after detection and prior to engaging too great?
Was Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) from previous engagements perceived correctly?
Figure 5 shows the beginning of the critical events audit trail.
Trigger Another
Critical Event?

































Figure 5. Critical event audit diagram.
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C. DENDRITIC
To determine the data requirements for the audit trail, it is necessary to construct a
dendritic prior to the running of a CAX. The purpose of the dendritic is to refine task
requirements to the point where data explicative of performance can be gathered. The
dendritic is formed by focusing on the overall intent of the related joint tasks across
levels of war and reformulating it in the form of a question. This question represents the
overall issue to be resolved. Likewise, corresponding functional areas form critical
subordinate issues that generally reflect the level at which the measures of effectiveness
(MOEs) are developed. Specific task requirements within each of the functional areas
serve to formulate yet another level of sub-issues that may determine underlying
measures of performance (MOPs). Continued refinement of task requirements ultimately
leads to the point where data can be gathered.
Data requirements are assumed to be unconstrained by physical mechanisms (i.e. data
base sizes, processing times, model resolution, etc.). Furthermore, they may be objective
or subjective. Objective data refer to those directly measurable or capturable within the
context of the computer simulation. Subjective data include non-measurable or non-
quantifiable factors that may stand alone or serve to help qualify observed results. A







How effectively is the
force protected? -
How effective is Operational Firepower?
How well are operational forces, non combatants,
and other means protected?
How effective is Operational Intelligence?
How well is deception conducted in support of subordinate
campaigns and major operations?
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How effective is
Operational Firepower?
How well are the detection
assets allocated?
How well are the firepower
assets allocated?
How fast is the firepower
response after detection?
Is a firepower asset
available?
What effects do the








Figure 6. Dendritic for Force Protection.
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D. DATA REQUIREMENTS
The dendritic shows the requirement for the detection time, the time the
munitions reach the target or engagement time, actual battle damage and perceived battle
damage. Normally, there is some delay between detection time and engagement time.
This time delay may be due to non-availability of firepower assets, poor
communications, time of flight (TOF) of a weapon system, range to the target exceeds
that of friendly weapon systems, or possibly another target is of higher priority, hence
requiring engagement prior to other detections. Depending on the type of target, a time
delay may or may not be a factor with respect to the effects of firepower. If the target
has continuous monitoring (i.e. from a forward observer), constant updates on the
target's location are given and the effects of munitions are reported almost immediately.
These real time intelligence updates allow for accurate battle damage assessment (BDA).
This information is then used to determine if the target requires re-engagement. In this
thesis, real time BDA will be referred to as actual BDA (BDAaCtual ).
1. Perceived Battle Damage Assessment
In the case where a target is not continuously monitored, the time difference
between target detection and munitions delivery is crucial. In this case, a CAX player
can only estimate the BDA. In this thesis, this type of BDA is considered as perceived
BDA. When determining perceived BDA, a person must rely on his knowledge of the
enemy forces, proficiency of the weapon system used, and account for the time delay
20
since the report. This time delay may or may not include a change of enemy location.
This difference in location (location error) may result in less than optimal effects of
munitions, but more importantly may be the reason for extremely inaccurate perceived
BDA. This inaccuracy will most likely affect the decision of whether or not to re-engage
the target. Obviously, the accuracy of BDA is essential, particularly where targets are
designated as High Payoff Targets (HPT). It is easy to see how perceived BDA will
most likely vary from person to person. This report shows how perceived BDA can be
estimated in a CAX without ambiguity between persons and enhance the effectiveness of
firepower.
2. Intelligence Report Score
This paper utilizes the intelligence report scoring concept from Towery 95
[Ref. 8] to show how target location error can be predicted and aid in the effectiveness of
firepower. Towery shows how the report score (RS) given in equation (1) can provide a
measure of how effective a CENC's intelligence staff was at providing valuable
information on "other than friendly units" (OTFUs ) with only limited assumptions as to
the structure of the decay of the value of the information as it ages.
Report Score (t) =(£> wUj(t))/3 ( 1
)
where
wLLj(t> - A utility weighting factor from to 1 of the depreciation of
intelligence data as a function of intelligence report element type,
other than friendly unit type, and age.
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indices:
i - Other than friendly Unit { 1st Rep Guard, 2nd Artillery Battalion...
}
t - time { in integer hours from the start of the CAX t = 1,2,3...}
j(t) - age of last intelligence update
1 - intelligence report element type {location, estimate COA, strength }
Towery suggests three possible functional forms, borrowed from the study of economics,
to express the manner in which intelligence information may be perceived to depreciate.
These three depreciation functions are not meant to capture every possible structure for
which information value will depreciate but to provide a sound starting point in the
development of utility weighting functions for the value of intelligence information
[Ref. 8].
w(t) = - a / + 1 and Oatat>l for < a </, t>0, (2)
w(t) = -(7-a/ for < a <1, t>0, (3)
w(t) = 1 - 1/(1+$ e^'jfor 0<a<l,$>0, t>0, (4)
Where
a and (3 are parameters fitted from data.
/ = time.
Figure (7) provides sample curves for the three functions given above with
specific parameters values.
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Figure 7. Depreciation of intelligence value with time.
One can easily see how the value of intelligence depreciates over time using this
methodology. Similarly, when a detected target is moving or likely to move, one can
also expect to see a possible degradation in the effects of firepower if the munitions do
not arrive at the detected location in a timely manner. By amending Towery's
intelligence report scoring and using these formulas, report scores may be used as
possible surrogates for location error. Once location error is determined, perceived BDA
can be calculated and made available to a player of a CAX immediately upon completion




3. Target Location Report Score
Modifying Towery's intelligence report scoring into equation (5), it is possible to
create a Location Report Score (LRS). The LRS is the value of the RS at the time of
munitions impact. Therefore, the LRS relates to the relative position of the target at the
time of impact after the initial detection was reported
LRSi(t)=(2:wU)j(td+ ^)/3 (5)
where
wLij(t) - A utility weighting factor from to 1 of the depreciation of
intelligence data as a function of intelligence report element type,
other than friendly unit type, and age.
indices:
i - Other than friendly Unit {1st Rep Guard, 2nd Artillery Battalion...}
t - time { in integer hours from the start of the CAX t = 1,2,3...}
td - time of detection
At - time difference between the initial detection and the engagement of
the target
1 - intelligence report element type {location, estimate COA, strength }
Figure 8 shows an example of a depreciation function with an hypothetical time
delay (A / = 20 time units) between the initial detection and engagement of the target.
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Figure 8 Depreciation of Location with time.
If there is no time delay (At=0) then RS = LRS with respect to the value of
intelligence and the relative position of the target at the time of impact. In this case, the
player can expect to achieve the best effects on the target based on the weapon system
used and the size of the target. These effects would then give the best expected battle
damage assessment (BDAE) possible. It is reasonable to assume that the player knows
what these best effects would be, given these known parameters.
Once the LRS is ascertained, perceived BDA (BDA
p )
can easily be computed as
shown in equation (6).
BDAp = LRS*BDAE (6)
Using Figure (8) as an example, note that At = 20 relates to an LRS of 0.63. IfBDAE




BDAp = 0.63 * 50
BDAp = 31.5 Targets.
If BDAp is equivalent to BDAa^, , then the LRS curve used is valid to report BDA
against these targets.
E. LOCATION REPORT SCORE CURVES
Obviously, using the correct depreciation curve is important to ascertain accurate
BDA. For example, detected aircraft on an enemy airfield have the ability to move
rapidly, quickly degrading the value of their reported location. This type of target may
have a more exponential type depreciation curve, whereas detected supply ships docked
in a port do not have the ability to leave the port rapidly, resulting in a very slow
depreciation of the location value. Similarly, a unit detected while moving over easily
maneuverable terrain may have an approximately linear curve to ascertain the LRS,
while a stationary unit likely to move after being detected may have more of a gradual
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This chapter demonstrates an application of the methodology for evaluating the
effectiveness of operational firepower as described in Chapter III using a computer
model currently in use for the training of CINC staffs. Specifically, it shows how, with
minimal planning prior to the onset of a CAX, a simulation model can furnish perceived
battle damage assessment necessary to provide greatly enhance firepower effectiveness.
It is important to emphasize that this experiment was not intended to demonstrate tactics
nor to evaluate the performance of the computer model.
A. JOINT THEATER LEVEL SIMULATION (JTLS)
The Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) is an interactive, multi-sided, joint
(air, land, naval, and special operations) and combined (coalition warfare) constructive
simulation model. It is used for both operational planning and training support. This
computer based wargaming system uses inherent functions - sea, air, land, special
operations, intelligence and logistics to model conflict (pre-combat, combat operations
and post combat) at the operational level of war with tactical fidelity. The Joint
Warfighting Center is the joint sponsor of JTLS and has used JTLS as the exercise driver
for several previous combined exercises. For example, JTLS was used as the exercise
driver for the combined exercise Keen Edge 94 in support of U.S. Forces and Japan's
Joint Self-Defense Forces, and for a combined U.S. Thailand exercise, Cobra Gold 95.
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The data base for this study was adapted from a modified Desert Storm scenario.
Routines for capturing the parameters required to implement the methodology were
developed by Rolands and Associates Inc., the primary contractor of JTLS. Specifically,
data capturing the actual damage to targets were sent to the post processor engagement
file which was in standard ASCII format that was easily read into a commercial
(£)
spreadsheet package, Microsoft Excel. A sample spreadsheet of these files is contained
in the Appendix.
B. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
To apply the specific methodology, three enemy units were created in the data
base. Specific target types and numbers were added to these units. These target types
were the Soviet made ZSU, an anti-air artillery weapon, and the hand-held SA7 (Grail),
an anti-air missile. These targets were designated as HPTs and engagement data were
collected on them. Again, these target types and their associated numbers were
formulated to demonstrate the methodology and may not be representative of an actual
combat organization of these units.
1. ZSU Target
Each unit was given different numbers of ZSU batteries for sensitivity analysis.
However, in all scenarios, each ZSU battery had nine launchers. Additionally, in all
scenarios the ZSU battery covered an area with a radius of 56 meters.
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2. SA7 Target
Each unit was given a total of fifteen SA7 weapons. All 15 weapons were
contained in a radius of 150 meters. These numbers remained the same for all three
scenarios.
3. Scenario A
In this scenario all three units were given the same radius (1000 meters).
However, the number ofZSU batteries was different in each unit: Unit A received eight
(8), Unit B received five (5), and Unit C received two (2). Since each ZSU battery
contains nine (9) launchers, the actual number of launchers per unit was 72, 45 and 1 8,
respectively. The probability of kill against a ZSU launcher given that it is hit (Pkill
|
Hit) remained constant at 0.37. Again, the number of SA7 weapons was set at fifteen
(15) per unit with a (Pkill | Hit) of 0.83 on each weapon. The actual JTLS computation
of Pkill is discussed later in this chapter.
4. Scenario B
In Scenario B, the number ofZSU batteries was held constant at five (5) per unit,
resulting in a total of 45 launchers per unit. A change was made in the radius of the
units: 700 meters for Unit A, 1000 meters for Unit B, and 1300 meters for Unit C. No
change was made to the SA7 weapons or to the Pkill data.
5. Scenario C
This scenario closely resembles Scenario B except for a change in the Pkill data
per target type. Pkill for the ZSU targets was set to 0.60 and to 0.97 for the SA7 targets.
All other parameters were the same as in Scenario B.
The firepower assets used to attack the units in all cases was the Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) weapon system. However, the Pkill generated from this weapon
system can be considered generic and may be associated with other types of operational
firepower assets. The difference in the Pkill can be considered as different types of
friendly firepower assets or the same asset with a change in the number of munitions
fired. Table 1 shows the three scenarios used in the application of the methodology.
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SCENARIO A
UNIT UNIT RADIUS NUMBER ZSlfs Pldll Lethality (ZSU) NUMBER SA7 Pldll Lethality (SA7)
A 1000 8 0.37 15 0.83
B 1000 5 0.37 15 0.83
C 1000 2 0.37
SCENARIO B
15 0.83
UNIT UNIT RADIUS NUMBER ZSlTs Pldll Lethality (ZSU) NUMBER SA7 Pkill Lethality (SAT)
A 700 5 0.37 15 0.83
B 1000 5 0.37 15 0.83
C 1300 5 0.37
SCENARIO C
15 0.83
UNIT UNIT RADIUS NUMBER ZSlTs Pldll Lethality (ZSU) NUMBER SA7 Pldll Lethality (SA7)
A 700 5 0.60 15 0.97
B 1000 5 0.60 15 0.97
C 1300 5 0.60 15 0.97
Table 1. Description of Three Scenarios used to apply the Methodology.
In each scenario, following initial detection of the units and without a change in
their location, they were engaged by the firepower asset. This engagement simulated a
time delay of zero (At =0 ). Following this initial engagement the units were restored to
their original strength and started moving along their pre-designated routes. After a time
elapse of one minute, the units were again engaged without change to the method of
delivery. The impact of the weapon effects remained at the original detection location,
thereby simulating a one minute time delay between unit detection and engagement
Again, the units were restored to their original strength and continued to move. This
process was repeated until the entire unit was outside of the weapons effect area. Each
time the units were engaged, the model captured the data in an ASCII engagement file.
Figure 10 depicts an example of a unit moving while the weapon effects impact location
remains the same. It is important to recall that the definition of At is the time difference

between detection and engagement. For each engagement, each target is stochastically
placed within the area of its parent unit. For example, the 8 ZSUs in Unit A were
randomly placed within Unit A at each time step. This stochastic placement is a major
factor when the unit area is larger than the weapons effects area, when there is partial
overlap with unit and weapons effects, or both.
At = At = l At = 2 At = 3 At = 4
e
t t t





f"j Weapon Effect Area
(~~^ Unit Area
Direction of Movement of Red Unit
Figure 10. Depiction of a moving target showing the difference in affected area of the weapon
based on the time difference (At) between the detection time and the engagement time.
C. DAMAGE TO TARGETS
To develop the methodology, it is important to understand how the JTLS model
calculates area damage to targets. For targets types, the distance between the impact




The weapon effects radius is larger than (or equal to) the target radius. In this
case, only some fraction of the weapon munitions fired have an effect, but the entire
target is affected. The number of weapon munitions that have an effect is then used to
determine the Pkill against the elements within the target. A special case arises when the
target location and impact point are collocated and the radii are identical. In that case, all
weapons are effective and the whole target is at risk.
2. Case Two
The target radius is larger than the weapons effects radius and the weapons effects
are completely enclosed within the target radius. In this case, all the weapon munitions
are effective but only a part of the target is at risk.
3. Case Three
The weapons radii are larger than the target radius and there is partial overlap.
First, the same probability of kill associated with the target in Case (1) is determined.
Second, a uniform draw between zero and one determines the fraction of the target
covered. This fraction is then multiplied by the Case (1) probability of kill to determine
a new probability of kill against the elements within the target. In this case only a
fraction of the munitions are effective, but they may cover all or part of the target.

4. Case Four
The target radius is larger than the weapons effects radius and there is partial
overlap. In this case, the effects fraction is computed as the Weapons Area/Target Area,
and a uniform draw between zero and the effects fraction determines the fraction of the
target area that is covered. That fraction, multiplied by the effects fraction, is the
fraction of the rounds that were effective. In this case, a fraction of the rounds always
affects a fraction of the target.
An illustration of the four possible cases of weapons effects against a target is
shown in Figure 1 1
.
Case 1 Target Area
Weapons
Effects Area
Case 3 Case 4
Figure 1 1 . Four cases showing how targets are affected by weapons munitions.
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D. PROBABILTY OF KILL (Pkill)
In each scenario the weapon effects adius remained constant at 1000 meters.
Since the battery radius is 56 meters in all three scenarios, either Case (1) or Case (3) was
used to determine the Pkill for each entity (launcher) within the battery. It is important
to mention that the difference in size of the unit radius is only a factor in the stochastic
placement of the batteries throughout the unit. The calculation of Pkill for the batteries is
based solely on the relationship of the battery location to the weapon effects impact







NRt = Number ofRounds in the battery area
CA = Covered Area (Area of the battery covered by the effects)
LA = Lethal Area for particular Weapon type, Target type
The parameters for Scenario "A" are used to show an example derivation of Pkill.
The additional nomenclature with their respective values is as follows.
Ri (Radius of Impact) = 1000 m
Rt (Radius of Battery) = 56 m
NR (Number of Rounds Fired) = 180 rds
At (Area of Battery) = Pi * (Rt) A2 = 9852 m 2
Aw (Area ofWeapons effects) = Pi * (Ri) A2 = 3141596 m 2
LA (Lethal Area) = 8000m A 2
CA (Covered Area) = 9852 m A 2
With the data given, equation (8) is used to compute the number of rounds that
impact in each battery area (NRt).
NR=^-*NR= n52m *i*0 rds =0.56rds (8)





is determined, the Pkill for each target is calculated using equation (7).
™ •,. , , «>^ j * 8000m
2
x „ „„
Pkill = 1 - exp (-0.56rds * ) = 0.37
9852/w 2
Once the Pkill value is determined, a Monte Carlo draw is conducted for each launcher in
the battery. For example, since there are nine launchers per ZSU, nine U(0, 1) draws are
conducted. For each number drawn that is less than or equal to 0.37, a launcher is
destroyed.
In the case where the target area is smaller than the weapons effect area and there
is an overlap (Case 3), then the first U(0,1) drawn is multiplied by the Pkill (in our
example 0.37) to obtain a new Pkill. The Monte Carlo draw is then matched against this
new Pkill to determine the number of launchers killed.
E. EXPECTED BDA
The expected BDA (BDAE) can be computed after the Pkill is determined.
Again, using Scenario "A", where unit A has 8 ZSU batteries each having 9 launchers, a
total of 72 launchers are present. BDAE is computed by multiplying the total number of
launchers in the unit by the Pkill. This number will give the expected number of
launchers killed. In the Scenario "A" example, BDAE equals 26.64 or approximately 27
launchers. Equation (9) is used to compute expected BDA.
BDAE =Pkill*J^Li (9)
Where:
T = Total number of Targets
Lf = Total number of Launchers in Target i
F. RESULT FOR ACTUAL BDA (BDA ACTUAL)
Table 2 shows data obtained from one run of each of the three scenarios. Figures
12 through 14 show graphical representations of actual BDA as the time between target
detection and target engagement increases. Using Figure 13 as an example, a noticeable
increase is seen in actual BDA at At = 4 and At = 6 (Scenario C) and at At = 6 and At = 9
(Scenario B). This increase may be the result of the stochastic placement of the targets
throughout the unit at those time intervals allowing for a target to be missed all together,
resulting in a Pkill equal to zero for that target. Another possible reason for the increase
may simply be that the U(0,1) draw did not produce a value less than or equal to the
determined Pkill. However, over the entire range in both scenarios the trend for actual
BDA is decreasing.
UNIT "A" UNIT "tt" UNIT "C
(Radius 1000 M) (Radius 1000 Mi (Radius 1000 M)
Delta (T) BDA (Actual) BDA (Actual) BDA (Actual)
mi in) ZSLs SA7 ZSUs SA7 ZSUs SA7
23 13 14 12 3 12
SCENARIO A 1 26 12 15 10 9 13
Pk (ZSL) = 0.37 2 26 12 7 9 2
Pk (SA7) = 0.83 3 26 12 18 12 4 10
4 28 12 1 1 4 14
5 22 15 14 4
6 24 13 12













UM'l "A" UNIT "B" UNn "c
(Radius 700 M) (Radius 1000 M , (Radius 1300 M)
Delta (T) BDA (Actual) BDA (Actual) BDA (Actual)
(m in) ZSUs SA7 ZSUs SA7 ZSUs SA7
15 12 12 12 3 12
SCENARIO B 1 19 15 21 1 1 9 4
Pk (ZSU) = 0.37 2 19 13 15 13 12 2
Pk (SA7) = 0.83 j 14 12 10 12 11 12
4 12 14 6 14
5 9 1 1 18 10 8 9
6 1 1 11 15 10 9
7 5 7 4 13




UNIT "A" UN*T "B" UNIT "C"
(Radius 700 M) (Radius 1000 M) (Radius 1300 Mi
Delta (T) BDA (Actual) BDA (Actual) BDA (Actual)
(mm) ZSUs SA7 ZSUs SA7 ZSUs SA7
26 14 25 14 6 15
SCENARIO C 1 26 1 5 26 14 18 7
PkZSU = 0.60 2 24 15 34 15 14 1
Pk SA7 = 0.97 3 18 15 32 1 1 1 15
4 19 15 4 16
5 6 14 21 12 11





Table 2. Data from one run of each scenario showing the actual number of







9 Launchers per Battery
72 Launchers Total
PKH1 (Launcher) = 037
o-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Time Difference (Minutes) Between Detection Time and Engagement Time
Figure 12. Unit A of Scenario A showing total number of ZSU launchers damaged at
each time difference. All 72 Launchers are available at each time interval.
Unit A
Scenarios B and C
Unit Radius 700M
5 ZSU Batteries
9 Launchers per Battery
Pkill (Launcher Scenario B) = 037







Time Difference (Minutes) Between Detection Time and Engagement Time
Figure 13. Unit A in Scenario B and C showing total number of ZSU launchers




Scenarios B and C
Unit Radius 1000 M
5 ZSU Batteries
9 Launchers per Battery
Pkill (Launcher Scenario B) = 0.37
Pkill (Launcher Scenario C) = 0.60
Unit "B" ZSUs
Time Difference (Minutes) Between Detection Time and Engagement Time
Figure 14. Unit B of Scenario B and C showing total number ofZSU launchers damaged at
each time difference. All 45 Launchers are available at each time interval for each scenario.
G. LOCATION REPORT SCORE APPLICATION (PERCEIVED BDA)
Once the value of the target location is generated, perceived BDA (BDA
p) can be
determined as explained in Chapter HI. Two Location Report Score functions are
presented here (Figure 15) to show the application of the methodology. LRS #1
(equation 10) is essentially one minus a logistic function with its parameters, a and (3, set
at 0.50 and 100, respectively. LRS #2 (equation 11) is the exponential depreciation
function with the decay rate parameter, a, set to 0.25.






w(t)= l-l/(l + 100exp(-0.5t))







2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Time (Minutes) Between Detecion Time and
Engagement Time
Figure 15. LRS Curves for computing Perceived BDA.
H. COMPARISON OF ACTUAL BDA AND PERCEIVED BDA
Table 3 shows the comparison of perceived BDA, generated from the
depreciation functions above, and actual BDA taken from scenario "A", unit "A" (Table
2). Column D is the expected BDA determined from equation (9). Columns E and F
show the perceived BDA data from LRS #1 and LRS #2, respectively. Data in Columns
H and I are the difference of perceived BDA values and actual BDA values (Column G).
There is a noticeable distinction between the magnitude of the values in Column H and
those in Column I. In other words, the values generated from LRS #1 are much closer to
the actual BDA values, making LRS#1 the better curve to report perceived BDA for this
target type.
In this example only the data generated from Scenario "A", Unit "A" were used.
The ideal curve was determined by applying the methodology to the two LRS curves
with specified parameters. The optimal application of the methodology is to produce
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numerous runs, with a combination of parameter values, then fit the best curve to the
data. Once this curve is determined, its formula with associated parameters can be
programmed into the simulation model. This would be done for all target types
frequently assigned as HPTs. It is necessary to include in the algorithm the ability for
the model to display the perceived BDA value to the player once an engagement takes
place. With this capability, a CAX player can determine if a target requires immediate
re-engagement, an intelligence update or no further action.
A B C D E V C a I
Delta <T) LRS#1 LRS#2 l£(BDA) BDAp (LRS #1) BDAp (LRS#2) BDA (actual) om JLKS#1 DiffLRS#2
0.9901 1.0000 27 27 27 23 4 4
1 0.9838 0.7500 27 27 20 26 1 -6
2 0.9735 0.5625 27 26 15 26 -11
3 0.9571 0.4219 27 26 11 26 -15
4 0.9312 0.3164 27 25 9 28 -3 -19
5 0.8914 0.2373 27 24 6 22 2 -16
6 0.8327 0.1780 27 22 5 24 -2 -19
7 0.7512 0.1335 27 20 4 15 5 -11
8 0.6468 0.1001 27 17 3 17 -14
9 0.5263 0.0751 27 14 2 19 -5 -17
10 0.4026 0.0563 27 11 2 5 6 -3
11 0.2901 0.0422 27 8 1 4 4 -3
12 0.1986 0.0317 27 5 1 7 -2 -6
13 0.1307 0.0238 27 4 1 3 1 -2
14 0.0836 0.0178 27 2 3 -1 -3
15 0.0524 0.0134 27 1 4 -3 -4
16 0.0325 0.0100 27 1 1 -1
17 0.0199 0.0075 27 1 1
Table 2!. Appli nation ol ? two Location Report Scores shovzing the difference iii computer
generated Perceived BDA and Actual BDA.
SUMMARY
This chapter has demonstrated through the use of small, illustrative examples how
the methodology described in Chapter III can be applied. This methodology is intended
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to show how the player during a CAX can improve the operational firepower
effectiveness. Due to time constraints only one realization of this methodology was run.
With additional runs as described in the previous section, this methodology could be
applied to ascertain a LRS for many target types, thereby creating a data base of targets
to estimate perceived battle damage assessment.
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This research has provided an exercise analysis methodology for evaluating the
effectiveness of operational firepower functions during a computer aided exercise. This
methodology includes structuring related joint tasks of the UJTL and developing issues
related to performance data requirements. Specifically addressed is the link between
intelligence tasks (detection) and firepower tasks (deliver) and the processing of High
Payoff Targets (HPTs). This methodology shows how, with planning prior to the start
of a CAX, a simulation model can provide perceived battle damage assessment necessary
to enhance firepower effectiveness.
Specific to this methodology is the use of the Location Report Score (LRS). The
LRS is proposed as a surrogate for target location error and can be used to predict
perceived battle damage assessment. The first step in this methodology is to determine
the Location Report Score curves needed to engage predetermined High Payoff Targets.
One strength of this methodology is that it is relatively uncomplicated but retains the
robustness necessary to be applicable in many different exercise scenarios with different
types of theater level models. This information can be presented to a player during a
CAX to improve firepower effectiveness.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter IV discusses how JTLS calculates area damage to targets. In the two
cases where there is partial overlap (Cases 3 and 4), a U(0,1) is drawn to determine the
fraction of target covered. The calculation for this overlap area is easily computed and
could be used instead of the U(0,1) draw.
The key to implementation of this methodology is the determination of the
Location Report Scores described in Chapter III. Through the use of simulation it is
possible to develop a library of depreciation curves which correspond to the target
location error for specific units and targets. This type of library is essential to
incorporate into the model prior to the onset of an exercise. With this enhanced data
base, the link between operational intelligence and operational firepower would improve,
both joint tasks would become more effectively implemented and a more realistic
exercise would be the result.
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APPENDIX
The report below is a sample of the JTLS output data imported directly into
Microsoft Excel for application of the perceived battle damage assessment as discussed
in Chapter IV.
lime Kng lype Shooter Weapon #Rds Lat Long Victim ObjectDam NameObj AmountDam
0.0701385 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.8111 41.5567 ZSU-23 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0708333 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 51.8111 41.5567 ZSU-23 SAM_AAA Launcher 4
0.0722222 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.8111 41.5567 ZSU-23 SAM_AAA Launcher 2
0.0725167 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.8111 41.5567 ZSU-23 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0736111 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.8111 41.5567 ZSU-23 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0743056 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.8111 41.5567 ZSU-23 SAMAAA Launcher 5
0.0701389 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41 .2486 ZSU-38ID SAM_AAA Launcher 2
0.0708333 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAM_AAA Launcher 4
0.0715278 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.5375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAM_AAA Launcher 2
0.0722222 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0725167 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAMAAA Launcher D
0.075 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0756544 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAM_AAA Launcher 2
0.0763889 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAM_AAA Launcher .?
0.0777778 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAM AAA Launcher 1
0.08125 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAMjVAA Launcher 4
0.0819444 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID SAMAAA Launcher 1
0.0701389 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID2 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0708333 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID2 SAM_AAA Launcher 5
0.0715278 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID2 SAMAAA Launcher 3
0.0736111 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ED2 SAM AAA Launcher 2
0.0743056 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID2 SAM_AAA Launcher 5
0.075 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID2 SAM_AAA Launcher 1
0.0756944 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID2 SAM AAA Launcher 3
0.0763889 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-381D2 SAM_AAA Launcher 4
0.0805556 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID2 SAMAAA Launcher 3
0.0701389 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAMAAA Launcher 2
0.0708333 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAM AAA Launcher 2
0.0715278 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAM AAA Launcher 4
0.0722222 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAM_AAA Launcher 6
0.0729167 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31 .9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAM__AAA Launcher 4
0.07361 1
1
Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAMAAA Launcher 4
0.0743056 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAM_AAA L3uncher 2
0.075 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAM_AAA Launcher 1
0.0770833 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID3 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0701389 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0708333 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-381D4 SAMAAA Launcher 3
0.0715278 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAM_AAA Launcher 5
0.0722222 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAMAAA Launcher ^
0.0729167 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAM AAA Launcher 4
0.0736111 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-381D4 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0743056 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAMAAA Launcher 5
0.075 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAM_AAA Launcher 4
0.0756944 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0763889 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.5375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAMAAA Launcher 3
0.0777778 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.0784722 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.5375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID4 SAM_AAA Launcher 1
0.0701389 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID5 SAM_AAA Launcher 1
0.0708333 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.5375 41.2486 ZSt>38ID5 SAMAAA Launcher 1
0.0715278 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID5 SAM_AAA Launcher S
0.0722222 Controller Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-381D5 SAM AAA Launcher 3
0.0725167 Control le^ Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-38ID5 SAM_AAA Launcher 3
0.07361 1 Cont^olie^ Controller DPICM-MLR 180 31.9375 41.2486 ZSU-381D5 SAMAAA Launcher ^
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